form of principles. 29 However, the inherent value judgments are not made explicit when a possible exception to immunities in cases of serious violations of human rights is technically analysed in terms of conflict of norms and hierarchy.
Making Values Explicit: The Constitutional Approach
The constitutional approach makes value judgments explicit. It requires an operation of weighing different principles and of balancing them. When it comes to immunities, it is quite easy to evaluate the interest of realising human rights which is opposed to granting immunities. It is more difficult to analyse the principles underlying sovereign immunity. Here it becomes crucial to analyse the importance of sovereign immunity for international relations as Judge Pellonpää did in Al-Adsani. 30 In a reply to this presentation, Anne Peters argued that state immunity was "purely instrumental", the state having "no instrinsic value". This is true at least from a German point of view, where the concept of a State having a dignity of its own has been discredited in the first half of the twentieth century. 31 Rather, the underlying values of state immunity are crucial. To the extent that immunities serve the functioning of international relations they may promote peace and by that even save human lives.
The Realism of a State-Centred Approach
When international judges and scholars rely on state practice and opinio iuris as the ICJ did in
Jurisdictional Immunities and as the ECtHR majority had done before in Al-Adsani, they are discharged from making own value judgments. Therefore, their approach may be called a realistic one. 32 This does not mean that ethics lose their importance for international law.
However, it is not up to international judges to introduce value judgments in their decisions.
Rather, ethics remain important to the extent that state practice is motivated by ethical considerations and that states rely on ethics in their reasoning which leads to the establishment of opinio iuris. 29 For an analysis of the relationship between principles and values see Alexy, Theory (n. 12), 86 et seq.
30 See above n. 25. 31 In the discussion, President Guillaume explained that the French State, which had preceded the French nation, is still conceived as a value. Pierre-Marie Dupuy agreed.
32 See also Bornkamm, "State Immunity" (n. 14), 778.
Conclusion
Legal arguments with regard to immunities in cases of serious human rights violations may be classified into three different approaches: a civilist, a constitutional and a state-centred one.
The state-centred approach is that of traditional international law. It is followed by the ICJ and it draws its legitimacy from state consent. The civilist approach is equally recognized in international law. The ICJ accepted the idea that a norm of ius cogens would take precedence over another norm of international law in case of conflict, whereas it took care to explain that there was no such conflict of norms. 33 However, a civilist method becomes problematic where it is used in order to implement certain value judgments without making them explicit.
The constitutional approach is a matter of fact in constitutional systems like that of the ECHR.
Weighing and balancing competing principles is an essential element of ECtHR case law.
However, it seems that this method requires a constitutional court which can authoritatively decide on the right balance to be struck in a given case. 
